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1. Introduction1
One of the aims of decentralisation is to increase publicparticipation in local decision-making. The claim isthat public participation, coupled with locallyaccountable representatives with real public powers,
will increase efficiency and equity in the use of public resources
(Agrawal & Ribot 1999). Since the advent of democracy in 1994,
South Africa has embarked on its own version of
decentralisation in a range of areas. For example, the White
Paper on Sustainable Forest Development in South Africa
describes the category of community forestry as implemented
by, or with the participation of, communities (Department of
Water Affairs and Forestry 1997:20). With regard to the
environmental management policy, the National Environmental
Management Act of 1998 advocates a strong role for civil society
participation in environmental governance (see Turner & Meer
1999:12).
In this paper, the issue of decentralisation and natural
resource management will be interrogated primarily through a
focus on local government reform and land administration. This
focus illuminates problems that are on the horizon for other
natural resources, such as forests, wildlife and fisheries,
especially as these latter resources are to be managed through
similar structures that are being constructed and contested in
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the local government and land policy arenas. Within this
context, the role of traditional authorities (chiefs of various
ranks) and municipal councillors will be assessed.
Section 40(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa establishes three spheres of government which are
distinctive, interdependent and interrelated, to wit, national,
provincial and local government. The local sphere of
government, in terms of Section 151(1), consists of
municipalities, which must be established for the whole of the
territory of the Republic. Section 151(4) states: The national or
a provincial government may not compromise or impede a
municipalitys ability or right to exercise its powers or perform
its function. The Constitution and the White Paper on Local
Government define post-1994 local government as
developmental local government, involving integrated
development planning. This requires municipalities to co-
ordinate all development activities within their areas of
jurisdiction (Manor 2001).
Developmental local government thus seeks not only to
democratise local government, by introducing the notion of
elected representatives even in rural areas, but also to transform
local governance, with a new focus on improving the standard of
living and quality of life of previously disadvantaged sectors of
the community (Manor 2001). In addition, developmental local
government requires that citizens should actively participate in
development initiatives in their areas (see Section 152(1)(e) of
the Constitution; African National Congress 1994:23; Ntsebeza
1999; 2000; 2001).
A legacy of the colonial and apartheid periods is that most
land in the rural areas of the former Bantustans is owned by the
state and the Development Trust, and administered and
managed (during the apartheid period) by government-created
tribal authorities. Although rural inhabitants are the de facto
owners of land, in the sense that they have lived in these areas
for long periods of time, landholding based on the permit to
occupy (PTO) system does not provide them with legally secure
title comparable to freehold title. It is, above all, this insecurity
of tenure that has created conditions for the exclusion of rural
inhabitants from the administration and management of what is
essentially their land. Land tenure reform aims to correct these
imbalances.
According to Section 25(6) of the South African Constitution:
A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure
as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is
entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to
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tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress.
Parliament is further obligated to enact legislation. These
constitutional provisions, coupled with the democratic principles
enshrined in the Constitution and various pieces of post-1994
legislation, establish conditions to set up new democratic and
accountable structures, with significant community
participation, as far as land administration and management are
concerned. The new structures will not necessarily be the new
developmental local government. However, whether land
administration functions are performed by local government or
not, local government will still be obliged to play its traditional
regulatory and control role and, since 1994, to fulfil its
developmental mandate.
The focus of this paper is on the institutional arrangements
that have been put in place to give effect to decentralisation and
its impact on natural resource management in the rural areas of
the old Transkei, South Africa. The paper will pay attention to
the various actors who hold power over natural resources, the
kinds of power they hold, the degree of community participation
and the accountability relations and mechanisms of
accountability to which these actors are subject. Of critical
importance will be a discussion of the role of traditional
authorities in post-1994 South Africa, particularly how they
have responded to current policies and laws. At the heart of the
discussion will be an assessment of the relationship between
theory and practice and implications for natural resource
management.
2. Decentralisation: Key concepts
An outline of two key concepts, political/democraticdecentralisation and decentralised despotism isuseful in order to understand South Africas dilemmain attempting to democratise rural areas, whilst at the
same time recognising hereditary traditional authorities.
Mamdanis (1996) thesis is that the colonial state in Africa
was bifurcated, with different modes of rule for urban citizens
and rural subjects. The colonial strategy of divide and rule
took two related forms: an enforced division of Africans along
ethnic lines, on the one hand, and an enforced division between
town and countryside, on the other. According to Mamdani, the
African was containerised, not as a native or indigenous
African, but as a  tribesperson. Colonialists justified indirect
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rule on the basis that tradition and custom were indigenous
forms of social organisation. But, they reinforced and used these
identities to divide and manage rural Africans. In order to
enforce their dual policy of ethnic pluralism and urban-rural
division, colonialists, Mamdani asserts, exercised force to an
unusual degree. In this way, colonial despotism was highly
decentralised (1996:224).
The chief, according to Mamdani, was pivotal in the local
state, the Native Authority. His authority was rooted in the
fusion of various powers, judicial, legislative, executive and
administrative, in his office, rather than the classic liberal
democratic notion of a separation thereof. Mamdani uses the
analogy of a clenched fist to delineate this concentration of
power. Native Authorities, according to him, were protected from
any external threat. Their officials were appointed from above
and never elected. They had no term of office, and remained
therein for as long as they enjoyed the confidence of their
superiors.
Mamdani argues that the colonial legacy was reproduced after
independence. However, no nationalist government was content
to reproduce the colonial legacy uncritically. Each attempted to
reform the colonial state, but in doing so reproduced a part of
that legacy, thereby creating its own variety of despotism. Post-
colonial African states, whether conservative or radical,
deracialised the colonial state, but, according to Mamdani, did
not democratise it. On democratic transformation, Mamdani
proposes nothing less than dismantling the bifurcated state.
This will entail an endeavour to link the urban and the rural 
and thereby a series of related binary opposites such as rights
and custom, representation and participation, centralisation
and decentralisation, civil society and community  in ways that
have yet to be done (1996:34).
These features of Native Authorities aptly capture the central
features of Tribal Authorities that were set up during the
apartheid period in South Africa. It is arguably in response to
these that the post-apartheid state is making efforts to
dismantle Tribal Authorities. It is not clear, however, how far
these new local political-administrative arrangements move away
from the system of decentralised despotism and toward a more
democratic form of rural governance. The constitutional
recognition of the hereditary institution of traditional
leadership without any clarity as to its roles, functions and
powers makes these questions about democratising rural
governance even more urgent.
Political/democratic decentralisation is said to occur when
powers and resources are transferred to authorities that are
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downwardly accountable to local populations (Agrawal & Ribot
1999). The aim is to increase public participation in local
decision-making. Advocates of this kind of arrangement believe
that locally accountable representatives with real public powers
and greater community participation will increase efficiency and
equity in the use of public resources. This notion of
decentralisation can be contrasted with other kinds of
decentralisation reforms taking place in the name of
democratisation and development. For example,
deconcentration or administrative decentralisation, and
privatisation, which are not democratic in nature, often
accompany or take place in the name of democratic
decentralisation reforms. Deconcentration occurs when the
central state transfers some responsibilities to its local
branches. In this regard, local branches are primarily upwardly
accountable to the central state, and not necessarily
downwardly accountable to the communities they are serving.
Proponents of democratic decentralisation consider this form of
decentralisation as weak, precisely because it is not
downwardly accountable and therefore democratic.
Whether privatisation could be regarded as a form of
decentralisation is a hotly debated issue. Those in dispute argue
that decentralisation concerns public resources, while
privatisation entails transferring public resources to private
groups and individuals who may or may not serve public
interests. As with deconcentration, these groups and individuals
are not necessarily obliged to be downwardly accountable to
the communities they serve. Also, the logic of privatisation is
quite different from that of decentralisation.
Manor (2001:2) has recently argued that studies of
democratic decentralisation point out three essential conditions
for democratic local government: substantial resources
(especially financial resources) from higher levels of government;
substantial powers to be devolved to local authorities; and
mechanisms to ensure that bureaucrats are accountable to
elected representatives, on the one hand, and mechanisms to
ensure that elected representatives are accountable to voters, on
the other hand.
Through the lens of local government and land tenure and
control, this paper investigates the degree to which rural
political-administration is shifting away from the closed fist
policies of colonial and apartheid decentralised despotism
towards more democratic and enfranchising forms of rural
authority.
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3. From decentralised despotism to
democratisation? Policy on rural local
government and land administration
Decentralisation in rural South Africa must beunderstood within its historical context. Prior to theintroduction of democracy in South Africa in 1994,especially during the apartheid period, local
government and land administration were concentrated or fused
in Tribal Authorities. These structures were imposed on
resisting rural inhabitants and were an extended arm of the
central state. They were, not surprisingly, undemocratic,
unaccountable, autocratic, and, in many instances, feared
(Ntsebeza 2001, 1999; Manona 1998; Mbeki 1984; Lodge 1983).
The post-1994 ANC-led South African government attempts to
separate, amongst others, local government, land ownership and
administration functions and powers, and decentralise them to
democratically accountable local institutions, with an emphasis
on the active participation of communities in decision-making
processes. The tension though, as will be seen below, is that the
same government also recognises the hereditary institution of
traditional authorities, seemingly without questioning their role
during the colonial and apartheid periods, on the one hand, and
clarifying their roles, functions, and powers in post-1994
developmental local government and land administration and
management, on the other hand.
3.1 Rural local government
The local sphere of government, according to the Constitution,
consists of municipalities, established throughout the country,
including rural areas. A transitional policy on rural local
government in the former Bantustans was initially established
1995. The 1995 law established a two-level structure, consisting
of a district council at a sub-regional level, and a range of
possible structures at local (primary) level.2 In rural areas, the
primary structures, established at magisterial district level, were
either transitional rural councils (TRCs), or transitional
representative councils (TrepCs). The main difference between
TRCs and TrepCs was that the former were accorded the powers
of a fully-fledged local authority, while TrepCs were accorded far
less powers, and were seen as fulfilling representative and
brokering functions. The District Council performed local
authority functions on behalf of TrepCs. In theory, TrepCs could
eventually evolve into effective and democratic local authorities.
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 7
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In practice, however, these structures never, at the end of the
transitional period in 2000, evolved into local authorities. This is
an important point to keep in mind given that almost all the
rural areas in the former Bantustans had TrepCs.
An integral aspect of developmental local government is
integrated development planning, which requires
municipalities, in addition to providing services, to co-ordinate
all development activities within their area of jurisdiction in
order to seek to improve the standard of living and quality of life
of previously disadvantaged sectors of the community. In this
regard, all municipalities are required to produce Integrated
Development Plans (IDPs) and Land Development Objectives
(LDOs). In terms of the White Paper on Local Government, the
LDOs should be seen as part of the IDPs and not as a separate
planning process. Both the Constitution and legislation
emphasise the need for community participation in the
formulation of IDPs to ensure that these plans are expressive of
the needs and priorities of local people, rather than central
government.
The role of traditional authorities (chiefs of various ranks) in a
post-1994 democracy, including local government, was never
explicitly stated from the beginning of the political negotiation
process that led to the first democratic election in 1994. In the
past, these authorities enjoyed unrivalled powers over a range of
activities in the rural areas of the former Bantustans. Both the
interim and final constitutions merely incorporated a clause
recognising the institution of traditional leadership without
any clarity or guidelines as to its roles, functions and powers.
The Local Government Transitional Act of 1993, as amended in
1995, provided an extremely limited, if not vague, role for
traditional authorities in local government. Defining them as an
interest group along with women and farm workers, the Act
gave traditional authorities not more than 10% representation
in an ex officio capacity.
3.2 Land administration
Attempts to empower rural residents by involving them in
decision-making processes on land issues were given a boost
with the launch of the White Paper on Land Policy in April
1997. The White Paper drew a crucial distinction between
ownership and governance in land issues in rural areas. This
distinction was blurred in the colonial and apartheid eras, as
the state was both legal owner and administrator of land. By
drawing the distinction, the White Paper introduced a
separation of the functions of ownership and governance, so
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that ownership can be transferred from the state to the
communities and individuals on land (Department of Land
Affairs 1997:93).
By the beginning of 1998, the Department of Land Affairs
(DLA) had developed principles that would guide its legislative
and implementation framework. These included that:
· These rights should vest in the people who are holders of
the land rights and not in institutions such as tribal or local
authorities. In some cases, the underlying rights belong to
groups and in other cases to individuals or families. Where
the rights to be confirmed exist on a group basis, the rights
holders must have a choice about the system of land
administration, which will manage their land rights on a
day-to-day basis.
· In situations of group-held land rights, the basic human
rights of all members must be protected, including the right
to democratic decision-making processes and equality.
Government must have access to members of group-held
systems in order to ascertain their views and wishes in
respect of proposed development projects and other matters
pertaining to their land rights.
· Systems of land administration, which are popular and
functional, should continue to operate. They provide an
important asset given the breakdown of land administration
in many rural areas. The aim is not to destroy or harm viable
and representative institutions. Popular and democratic
tribal systems are not threatened by the proposed
measures. (Thomas et al. 1998:528)
Three issues need to be highlighted in this regard. First, we
should consider the distinction between land ownership and
governance. Following the DLA principles, members of
particular communities become co-owners of land. This is an
ownership issue. As co-owners, the principles imply, it will be
up to them to decide how they want their land to be
administered. The latter is an issue of governance. It is precisely
the blurring of this distinction that was at the heart of colonial
and apartheid rule. Bantustans that opted for independence,
such as the Transkei, also did not make this distinction, as
communal land remained state land.
A further implication of this distinction is that the
concentration or fusion of power in Tribal Authorities would be
undermined. There would, instead, be a clear separation of
powers. The four main actors are: landowners (the broad
community), land administrators or managers (the officials/
bureaucrats), traditional authorities and local government. The
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 9
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latter two will not be the owners of land, and will not necessarily
have the right to allocate land, unless specifically asked by the
landowners to do so. With regard to local government, however,
it is important to note that no land rights are absolute, either in
urban or rural areas. As a body representing public interests
and given that, in terms of the Constitution, municipalities
should be established throughout the country, local government
has control, regulatory and (in terms of the Constitution)
development functions.
Lastly, it is quite clear from the above that the Department of
Land Affairs intended to subject traditional authorities to a
system that would make them more representative and
accountable to their communities. However, establishing
democratic and accountable structures while recognising an
undemocratic and unaccountable institution of traditional
leadership, especially in the form it has been inherited from the
apartheid past, is a fundamental contradiction. I develop this
further below.
Law that would give effect to the above policies laid down in
the White Paper on Land Policy has yet to see the light of the
day. The unresolved question of the role of traditional
authorities in local government and land reform seems central
to this delay.
4. The reaction of traditional authorities, and
government shift
Traditional authorities are vehemently opposed to themoves of the ANC-led government to introducedecentralisation and democratisation in rural areasunder their jurisdiction. What is striking about the
post-1994 period is that traditional authorities, despite earlier
divisions, seem to be drawing closer and closer to one another
(Ntsebeza 2001; 1999). While the initial collaboration was
around local government, it is quite clear that the main issue
that brings traditional authorities together is their opposition to
the notion of separation of powers. They would be happy to
preserve the concentration of power they enjoyed under
apartheid. Not only are they opposed to the idea of the
separation of powers, they are also opposed to any attempt to
introduce alternative structures that would compete with them.
With regard to land tenure reform, traditional authorities agree
with government that land in the rural areas of the former
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Bantustans should not be the property of the state. However,
they reject the notion that where land is held on a group basis,
it should be transferred to democratically constituted and
accountable legal entities such as Communal Property
Associations.
Government seems to have succumbed to the above pressure
exerted by traditional authorities. As we have seen, policy and
legislation in the immediate post-1994 period seemed, on the
whole, to have been driven by a commitment to extending
participatory and representative notions of democracy to rural
areas. An expression of this radicalism was the promulgation of
the Regulation of Development in Rural Areas Act, 1997 by the
Eastern Cape Legislature. This Act sought to divest traditional
authorities of all their development functions and transfer these
to elected councillors. This, of course, was in line with new
functions of local government. However, since the end of 1997,
the pendulum seems to have swung in favour of traditional
authorities (Ntsebeza 2001). The White Paper on Local
Government published in March 1998 makes broad and
sweeping statements about the possible role that traditional
authorities can play. Traditional leadership is assigned a role
closest to the people. On the issue of development, a task that
has been added to local government by the Constitution, the
White Paper (1998:77) boldly asserts: There is no doubt that
the important role that traditional leaders have played in the
development of their communities should be continued.
The recommendation in the White Paper that the institution
of traditional leadership should play a role closest to the
people flies in the face of the recommendation of the 1994 ANC
election manifesto, the Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP). The RDP was emphatic that democratically
elected local government structures should play this role. The
White Paper thus marks a major shift in government policy, and
has grave consequences for the possibility of democracy in rural
areas. Similarly, the Constitution has explicitly added
development functions to democratically elected local
government structures. Yet, the White Paper recommends that
traditional authorities should continue performing these tasks.
Moreover, the statement that traditional authorities played an
important role in development among their communities must
be viewed with suspicion. No evidence is adduced to support this
statement. Existing evidence shows that traditional authorities
were never directly involved in development projects. These
projects were implemented by government line-departments.
Where traditional authorities have acted as a link between
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government departments and their communities, research has
shown that they have often been corrupt. An example is the
illegal taxes traditional authorities imposed in the process of
land allocation (Ntsebeza 1999).3
The issue of the role of traditional authorities was the subject
of much discussion and negotiation in the run-up to the second
democratic local government election in December 2000. It was
instrumental in causing the postponement of announcing the
date for the election. The position of the government was, in the
run-up to the election, still ambivalent. After a series of
meetings between the government and traditional authorities,
the government made some concessions. The first significant
concession was the amendment of the Municipal Structures Act,
which was successfully rushed through Parliament just before
the local government elections. The amendment increases the
representation of traditional authorities from 10% to 20% of the
total number of councillors. Further, traditional authorities
would not only be represented at a local government level, but
also at a District and, in the case of KwaZulu-Natal,
Metropolitan level. Traditional authorities, though, would not
have the right to vote.
This concession seemed to have encouraged traditional
authorities to ask for more. They rejected the 20% increase.
They wanted nothing short of amending the Constitution and
legislation flowing from it regarding municipalities in rural areas
in the former Bantustans. They wanted municipalities to be
scrapped in these areas in favour of apartheid era Tribal
Authorities as the primary local government structures.
Traditional authorities have claimed that the President had
promised them, in word and in writing, that their powers would
not be tampered with. If anything, they would be increased.4 On
his part, the President has neither denied nor endorsed the
traditional authorities claim. This makes it difficult to know the
implications of this statement in terms of policy, law and
practice.
The manner in which this vexed issue of the role of traditional
authorities in a post-1994 democratic South Africa is handled
and negotiated is intriguing. In so far as local government issues
are concerned, traditional authorities fall under the Department
of Provincial and Local Government. In practice, though,
traditional authorities do not seem to be recognising this
Department. They prefer that the President and the Deputy
President handle their matters. For example, traditional
authorities have submitted almost all their requests to the Office
of the President. They seem to think that the Minister of
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Provincial and Local Government is not as favourably disposed
towards them as the President. Alternatively, this might be a
deliberate strategy to pit the President against the Minister.
The response of government was, for the second time in as
many months, to present a Bill to parliament to amend the
Municipal Structures Act. The Bill did not address the central
demand of traditional authorities  the scrapping of
municipalities in rural areas in favour of Tribal Authorities. The
Bill merely sought to give local government powers to delegate
certain powers and functions to traditional authorities. In
addition, a range of peripheral duties would be assigned to
traditional authorities. Predictably, traditional authorities
rejected the Bill and threatened to boycott the 2000 local
government election. They also threatened that there would be
violence in their areas if their demands were not met. The Bill
was subsequently withdrawn on a technicality. It would seem
that the President made some undertakings, given that
traditional authorities eventually participated in the election.
A much shorter draft amendment of the Municipal Structures
Act was published on 20 November 2000 for public comment. It
seems clear from this draft amendment that a trade-off is
proposed. The government has resisted amending the
Constitution regarding municipalities in rural areas. However,
the draft amendment to the Municipal Structures Act gives
traditional authorities control over the allocation of land in so-
called communal areas. According to section 81(1)(a) of the
Municipal Structures Second Amendment Bill:
Despite anything contained in any other law, a traditional
authority observing a system of customary law continues to
exist and to exercise powers and perform functions
conferred upon it in terms of indigenous law, customs and
statutory law, which powers and functions include  (a) the
right to administer communal land 
The South African Legal Resources Centre has, with just cause,
objected to this clause. In its submission to the Portfolio
Committee on Provincial and Local Government, the Legal
Resources Centre has pointed out that the phrase, Despite
anything contained in any other law has the effect of overriding
a vast but undeterminable number of laws in a vast but
undeterminable number of areas of our national life. The Legal
Resources Centre interpreted the phrase to mean that, as far as
development and the management and use of natural resources
are concerned, this Act over-rides the requirements of other
critical national laws.5 These national laws would include laws
on environmental affairs and local government. These laws insist
School of Government, University of the Western Cape 13
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that citizens should be accorded the right to democratic
participation in decisions that affect them. At the time of writing
this paper, however, the draft amendment had not been
discussed in the Portfolio Committee. In this Committee, the
public is given an opportunity to make an input before the Bill
is presented to Parliament.
5. Decentralisation in rural South Africa: What type?
It is difficult to neatly classify decentralisation in rural SouthAfrica into either of the categories described above:decentralised despotism and democratic/politicaldecentralisation. There is a sense in which it could be
argued that by insisting on decentralised representative and
participatory structures, post-1994 policies on local government
and land reform, for example, meet the requirements of political
decentralisation. Problems arise, though, when the thorny issue
of the role, functions and powers of traditional authorities have
to be considered, especially given the constitutional recognition
of the  institution of traditional leadership. The key question
that needs to be addressed is whether the institution of
traditional leadership is compatible with democratic
decentralisation or not.
The Department of Land Affairs has attempted to marry the
two systems by suggesting that there may be examples of a
popular and democratic tribal system. However, given that no
examples of these tribal systems are provided, it is not clear
what this statement means in late-twentieth-century South
Africa. If the  tribal systems referred to incorporate the
institution of traditional leaders, I would argue that it is not
possible to marry the two systems. The institution of traditional
leadership can be democratic in one important respect: the
involvement of rural residents in decision-making processes.
This was indeed the hallmark of governance in most southern
African societies at the advent of colonialism.6 However, there is
a critical sense in which the institution in South Africa cannot
be democratic. In so far as so-called traditional leadership is
based on ascribed, hereditary rule, the possibility of rural
residents having the freedom to choose which institution and/or
individuals should rule them is automatically excluded. Yet, it is
precisely this right upon which the South African Constitution
is based.
It is possible to argue that the proposed accommodation of
popular and functioning  tribal systems was a pragmatic move,
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especially given the war in mainly rural KwaZulu-Natal in the
1980s and 1990s and considering that government does not
have the capacity to set up and monitor new structures. Even if
this were the case, the issue of the meaning of democracy in
post-1994 rural South Africa would stand. More specifically,
whether rural residents should continue to be subjects after
1994, when their counterparts in urban areas enjoy citizenship
rights, would still haunt us. My position is that democracy
should, at least, be both participatory and representative, rather
than one or the other. Ensuring that rural residents enjoy the
right to choose their representatives remains one of the key
challenges of the ANC-led, post-1994 government.
It is important to note that the issue of traditional authorities
is not the only stumbling block to achieving democratic
decentralisation in South Africas countryside. The system of
electing representatives is another problem. During the
transition period, the system adopted was proportional
representation. After the transition in 2000, this system still
applies, although voting for some seats is based on a
constituency basis. According to the proportional representation
system, rural people vote for political parties. The main problem
with this system is that councillors are prone to be primarily
accountable to their political parties, or the leadership thereof
rather than downwardly accountable to voters. We have seen
that downward accountability is considered by commentators
such as Manor (2001) and Agrawal and Ribot (1999) as an
essential element of democratic decentralisation.
The ambivalence of government regarding the role of
traditional authorities in a democratic dispensation and the
system of election, thus, throw serious doubts about the
prospects of democratic decentralisation in rural areas. As will
be seen in the next section, the unresolved question of the role
of traditional authorities in particular creates a state of
confusion on the ground, especially as to who has rights over
land administration in rural areas between traditional
authorities and rural councillors, with potentially grave
implications for natural resources.
6. Implications for natural resources
The majority of rural areas in the former Bantustanswere, in the run-up to the 1994 elections, characterisedby deep tensions and clashes between traditionalauthorities and groups in civil society led by residents
associations. The most popular civil organisation that emerged
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from around 1993 was the South African National Civic
Organisation (SANCO). At the centre of these struggles was
control over land, in particular, land allocation. In many rural
areas residents associations led by SANCO took over the land
allocation functions from traditional authorities. By 1994, there
was a breakdown in land administration, including the issue of
PTOs, in many rural areas.
After the 1995/6 local government elections, these tensions
manifested themselves as between elected rural councillors and
SANCO on the one hand, and traditional authorities, on the
other hand. The majority of rural councillors were drawn from
SANCO activists. The confusion as to whose function it was to
allocate land continued unabated. This was particularly the case
in areas where civic structures and traditional authorities were
almost equally represented in terms of popular support. There
are two levels at which this dilemma could be understood and
explained: the law and practice. The laws governing the
allocation of land in the rural areas of the former Bantustans
have not been repealed. In this regard, the South African
Constitution is clear that existing laws will remain in force until
such time that they have been replaced by appropriate
legislation. We have seen above that the processes of
establishing legislation that would clarify questions such as land
allocation in post-1994 rural South Africa have not borne any
fruit. This then means that as far as the legal position is
concerned, apartheid laws regarding allocation of land in rural
areas remain in force.
Reality on the ground, though, is different. Most rural
residents, including rural councillors themselves, and indeed
many South Africans, thought that land allocation was to be one
of the responsibilities of the newly elected councillors. After all,
control over land was the cardinal issue in rural struggles in the
early- to mid-1990s. The perception of most rural residents was
that all the functions that were performed by traditional
authorities, including land allocation, would be taken over by
elected councillors. These residents, and rural councillors in
particular, got a rude shock when it turned out that the old
apartheid laws were still in place. Above all, government officials
still use, with minor adjustments, the apartheid procedure and
do not recognise elected councillors as having the powers to
allocate land. The extent of the above confusion, the dilemma of
rural residents and the role of the officials of government, are
best captured in the following response to the question as to
who is responsible for land allocation in areas falling under the
jurisdiction of traditional authorities. One resident stated:
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This is the reason why we still use chiefs. Rural councillors
run in circles. This makes us a laughing stock and divides
us. People will tell you: Go to your rural councillor, you
wont succeed. You end up going to the chief, even if you
did not want to. At the magistrates offices they ask you
about the stamp [of the Tribal Authority]. If you do not have
the stamp they will say: Dont waste our time. The land
issue is complex. There is a struggle between TrepCs
[elected rural councillors] and the headman. The former
brought electricity and telephones, but land is in the hands
of chiefs. You are forced to be flexible [kufuneka ubemvoco]
otherwise you wont get your benefits. When we wanted
land for pre-schools we were told to go to the headman,
something that made the headman boastful. Sometimes you
may have spoken badly about the headman, and you end
up bowing down to it, as it is often necessary that you get
what you want. With chiefs and headmen it takes a few
days to get what you want, whereas with rural councillors it
takes months, and even then you end up not succeeding.7
The above reflects experiences in one administrative area where
inhabitants were divided between supporters of the headman,
on the one hand, and civic structures and rural councillors, on
the other. In this area, civic structures under the auspices of
SANCO demarcated land and allocated plots to its supporters.
Those who were allocated plots, however, were not granted PTOs
as the government officials did not recognise their process. It is
partly this dilemma that the informant was referring to.8
The above quotation also says something about the
performance of rural councillors. It is quite clear from interviews
with many rural inhabitants across gender and generation that
there was a lot of expectation that a developmental local
government would transform their lives. By the end of the
transition period in 2000, though, rural councillors had lost the
confidence of ordinary rural residents who initially supported
them. The main cause of the disgruntlement seems to have
been lack of delivery of even basic services such as water and
road maintenance. There are a number of reasons why
performance has been poor, especially lack of adequate support
from government in the form of allowances that could attract
capable and skilled people, and a budget that could provide
capacity-building for councillors and finance essential services.9
The lack of skill among councillors became evident when IDPs,
so critical to developmental local government, had to be
prepared. In many parts of the countryside, the IDP process was
either not started, or never finalised. Where it was completed,
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consultants were the driving force behind the process and there
was barely any participation of communities as required by the
constitution and legislation.
Implications for natural resource management in such a state
of confusion and lack of capacity outlined above are grave. In
many areas, common resources such as grazing land, sand,
grass and, in the case of the Wild Coast, sea resources, have
been reduced to open access. Most of these resources are
harvested without any control or limitations. Often these
resources are controlled by the powerful, be it traditional
authorities, councillors or warlords. Rotational grazing that used
to be practiced is no longer in force.
7. Conclusion
The focus of this paper has been on the institutionalarrangements that have been put in place to give effect todecentralisation and its impact on natural resourcemanagement in the rural areas of the old Transkei,
South Africa. Proceeding from the basis that post-1994 South
Africa is moving from an authoritarian apartheid regime to a
democracy that is strongly influenced by liberal democratic
values that include representative government, the paper has
employed two key concepts to analyse decentralisation in rural
South Africa: decentralised despotism (Mamdani 1996) and
democratic decentralisation (Manor 2001; Agrawal & Ribot
1999).
It is not possible to assess the impact of democratic
decentralisation in rural South Africa, for the simple reason that
decentralisation in this sector is at best incomplete. In the area
of land administration, the law that would establish a post-1994
system of land ownership and administration has not, after
more than seven years, been promulgated. Although laws exist
to establish developmental local government, the full
implementation thereof has yet to happen. I have argued that
the major stumbling block is the unresolved question of the
roles, powers and functions of traditional authorities in land and
local government reform. Democratic decentralisation, with its
insistence on elected representatives, is incompatible with the
recognition of a hereditary institution of traditional leadership.
Apart from the problem posed by the role of traditional
authorities, this paper has argued that another problem is the
lack of adequate government support for the newly established
democratic structures.
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Both these problems have led to a state of confusion with
potentially disastrous consequences for natural resources
management and environmental protection. The absence of
rules, formal and informal, in many rural areas in the Eastern
Cape, with regard to grazing and harvesting of natural
resources, raises serious questions about the future of these
resources and impact on the environment.
8. Recommendations
The post-1994 ANC-led government must resolve thequestion of roles, functions and powers of traditionalauthorities in a democracy, taking into account theincompatibility of democratic decentralisation and
hereditary rule that underlines traditional authority rule. As
already pointed out, the central issue here is whether rural
residents should continue to be subjects, when their
counterparts in urban areas enjoy the full rights of citizens.
Ensuring that rural residents enjoy the right to choose their
own representatives and leaders is thus a key challenge. In this
regard, the following recommendations are made:
· Land rights should vest in the people who are holders of the
land rights and not in institutions, be they tribal or local
authorities.
· Where the rights to be confirmed exist on a group basis, the
rights holders must have a choice about the system that will
administer their land on a day-to-day basis. This will ensure
that the system is directly accountable to the rights holders.
· The basic human rights of all members must be protected,
including the right to democratic decision-making processes
and equality.
· Existing institutions should only be used where it has been
established that they enjoy the support of rural residents.
· Government must establish dedicated structures to ensure
effective and efficient operationalisation of its tenure policies
and laws.
· Adequate financial resources should be made available to
ensure that the personnel in newly created democratic
structures in local government and land reform are properly
trained and assisted in providing basic services.
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Endnotes
1. This paper was originally written for a workshop on
decentralisation and the environment, organised under the
auspices of the Institutions and Governance Program of the
World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C.  The workshop
was held in Bellagio, Italy between 1822 February, 2002.
I would unreservedly like to thank Jesse Ribot, of the World
Resources Institute, for permission to publish this paper in
the PLAAS Occasional Paper Series.
2. The sub-regional level consisted of a few magisterial
districts. A magisterial district consisted of a district town
and a number of administrative areas.
3. This shift in ANC thinking regarding traditional authorities
should be seen against the backdrop of a wider conservative
shift in the ANC soon after the 1994 election. The
announcement of the Growth, Employment and
Redistribution (GEAR) economic policy was the first major
expression of this shift (Fine & Padayachee 2001; Aliber
2001; Bond 2000; Marais 1998).
4. It has not been possible for me to get a copy of, or to verify
this commitment on the part of the President.
5. Submission by the Legal Resources Centre to the Portfolio
Committee on Provincial and Local Government, 18 January
2001.
6. It should be pointed out, though, that only men participated
in these gatherings (iimbizo/pitso/kgotla). Further, these
systems differed, and some were more autocratic than
others (Ntsebeza 1999).
7. Interview with Mr Jama, Cala, 9 September 2000.
8. There are many similar cases.
9. For details, see Ntsebeza 2001; 2000; 1999.
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